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Kokal: Kokal: Rambo I

Rambo I: The Missouri Supreme Court vs.
The Wrongful Death Statute-Prelude to
the Sequel?
Rambo v. Lawson'
I. INTRODUCTION

Rambo v. Lawson2 answered the question left open by O'Grady v.
Brown.' O'Grady determined that a wrongful death cause of action existed
for the death of a viable fetus. The O'Grady court, however, did not decide
the question of whether a wrongful death cause of action existed for the death
of a non-viable fetus. 5 Rambo held that Missouri 6 does not recognize a
wrongful death cause of action for a non-viable fetus.
Rambo also significantly impacted Missouri law in two other areas. First,
Rambo refused to breathe substantive life into the Missouri anti-abortion
statutes7 beyond the abortion context. Because the anti-abortion statutes
provide that "all laws" of Missouri should be changed to hold that "life begins
at conception" and to endow a fetus with full property and legal rights, 9 it
is puzzling that the court resisted applying the statute to determine fetal
wrongful death rights.'" Part III of this Note will analyze the court's
reticence with applying the anti-abortion statute to the wrongful death context.
Second, and perhaps even more interesting for the future of Missouri
wrongful death law, was the concurring opinion in Rambo written by Judge
Robertson. Judge Robertson's opinion is significant because it applies the
legislative re-enactment rule of statutory construction," a rule previously

1. Rambo v. Lawson, 799 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1990).
2. Id.
3. 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983).

4. Id. at 911.
5. Id.

6.Rambo,799 S.W.2d at 63.
7. Id.
at 63-64. See infra note 74 and accbmpanying text for the text Missouri's
anti-abortion statute, Mo. REv. STAT. § 6250 (1986). See also Mo. REV. STAT..

§ 188.015(6) (1986) for the definition of an unborn child.
8. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (1986).
9. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 63 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (1986)).
10. Id. at 64.
11. For a complete analysis of the legislative reenactment rule of statutory
construction, see infra notes 163 & 164 and accompanying text.
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applied only in the areas of tax or corporate law, to the area of tort law
(wrongful death).12 Judge Robertson's application of the statutory construction rule should come as no surprise, however, because of the increasing
development in Missouri of a statute-based tort law. 13 As Missouri tort law
becomes more based in statute, Missouri courts will increasingly rely on
statutory construction arguments to resolve tort law controversies.
Judge Robertson's opinion may also represent a trend of the court's
reasoning on the fetal wrongful death issue. Judges Blackmar, Higgins, and
Billings, the three judges who signed the Rambo majority opinion, face
imminent retirement or are presently not sitting on the Missouri Supreme
Court. 14 Thus, the two judges ascribing to the concurring opinion, Judges
Robertson and Covington, now comprise a majority of judges who decided
Rambo and remain on Missouri's highest court. 5 For these reasons, Part II
of this Note will critically analyze Judge Robertson's statutory construction
argument in Rambo as a blueprint for future Missouri tort law.
II. LEGAL HISTORY OF MISSOURI'S WRONGFUL DEATH
CAUSE OF ACTION
The original Missouri Wrongful Death Statute was enacted in 1 8 5 5 .16
Missouri courts originally interpreted this statute to create a wrongful death
cause of action that did not exist at common law. 17 Because the common

12. The legislative reenactment rule of statutory construction has never been
applied to Missouri tort law. For examples where the rule has been applied in the
fields of tax and corporate law, see Roy F. Stamm Elec. Co. v. Hamilton Brown Shoe
Co., 171 S.W.2d 580 (Mo. 1943); State ex. rel Steed v. Nolte, 138 S.W.2d 1016 (Mo.
1940); State ex. rel Gentry v. Meeker, 296 S.W. 411 (Mo. 1927).
13. Many areas of tort law that were originally based in common law causes of
action now have a statutory basis. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 538.205-.235 (1986) (tort
actions based on medical malpractice); § 281.065 (liability of certified commercial
pesticides); § 537.037 (liability of paramedics rendering emergency medical treatment);
§ 537.180 (liability of railroads for injuries to employees); § 537.105 (liability of radio
stations for defamation actions).
14. At present, Judge Blackmar is the only judge on the Rambo majority still
sitting on the Missouri Supreme Court.
15. This is because the three judges of the Rambo majority, as mentioned at supra
note 14, face mandatory retirement or are currently not sitting on the Missouri
Supreme Court. Further, the only dissenting judge who does not face mandatory
retirement next year is Judge Holstein.
16. Mo. REV. STAT. § 3, p. 648 (1855) (current version at Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 537.080-.090 (1986)).
17. State v. Saues, 283 S.W. 51, 56 (Mo. 1926); Gilkeson v. Missouri Pac. R.R.
Co., 121 S.W. 138 (Mo. 1909).
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law did not recognize the wrongful death action, the Missouri courts deemed
the wrongful death action to be substantive law and strictly construed it.' 8
The Missouri Supreme Court first addressed the issue of fetal wrongful
birth in Buel v. United Railway Company.9 Buel denied wrongful death
recovery for the parents of a viable fetus injured en ventre sa mere (in the
womb), born alive, but dying later as a result of the pre-natal injuries.20
Buel's analysis derived from two landmark common law wrongful death cases
that shaped American law for nearly sixty years: Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northhampton2' and Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital.22 Dietrich and Allaire
held that because an unborn child cannot be considered a separate legal entity
from its mother, there can be no recovery in wrongful death for injuries the
child sustained before birth.23
In 1953, Steggal v. Morris4 overruled Buel and declined to follow the
Dietrich and Allaire reasoning.25 Steggal held that the law attributes "a legal
personality to an unborn child."26 Because a child is a person, the child
could maintain a cause of action after its bith for injuries received before its
birth. 27 The Steggal court also took the next logical step and held that if the
injury caused the death of the child after birth, the parents of the child could
maintain a cause of action for the wrongful death of the child. 28
In Steggal, however, the child was born alive. 29 The decision did not
address the question of whether the parents of a still-born child could maintain
a wrongful death suit against the tortfeasor. This question was answered in
the negative in 1965 with the case of Acton v. Shields.'0 In Acton, relatives
of the fetus were not allowed wrongful death recovery for the death of the
fetus. 3' The court denied wrongful death recovery to the relatives because

18. Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 66 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. 1933).

19. 154 S.W. 71 (Mo. 1913).
20. Id. at 72.
21. 138 Mass. 14 (1884) (Holmes, J.).
22. 56 N.E. 638 (IlL. 1900).

23. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 16-17; Allaire, 56 N.E. at 640-41. For a further
discussion of the reasoning in Dietrich andAllaire, see Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 67-69
(Holstein, J., dissenting).
24. 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953).

25. Id. at 579.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 578.
386 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1965).
Id. Note that in 1965, the Missouri wrongful death statute required that

claimants prove pecuniary losses as a pre-requisite to wrongful death recovery:
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they could not prove actual damages, a prerequisite to a recovery under
section 537.080 of Missouri's wrongful death statute, which states the
following:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect
or default of another, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if
death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action

and recover damages in respect thereof,then, and in every such case, the
person who or the corporation which would have been liable if death had
not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the
death of the person injured, which damages may be sued for and recovered.32
The relatives of the deceased baby in Acton were denied relief because
they could not demonstrate that they were damaged as a result of the baby's
death. 3 To prove damages, section 537.090 of the old Missouri Wrongful
Death statute required that the plaintiff suffer pecuniary loss from the death
of the fetus. The statute stated that "parties [are] entitled there to such
damages as will fairly and justly compensate such party or parties for any
damages he or they have sustained and are reasonably certain to sustain
....
,"4 Therefore, because the Acton relatives could not prove pecuniary
loss, they were denied wrongful death recovery.' By denying recovery on

In every action brought under section 537.080, the trier of the facts may
give to the party or parties entitled thereto such damages as willfairly and
justly compensate such party orpartiesfor any damages he or they have
sustained and are reasonably certain to sustain in the future as a direct

result of such death. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending
the death may be considered by the trier of the facts.
See historical note to Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (1979) (emphasis added). Thus, a
different result might have been reached in Acton if the parents had brought suit.
Presumably, parents of the fetus would be in a better position than relatives to prove
pecuniary losses.
32. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (1978) (prior to 1979 amendments). For the text
of the 1979 amendments, see infra text at note 44. Thus, in effect, Acton held that the
death of the fetus was not an event, which "if death had not ensued, would have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof'
because the relatives of the fetus would not have been able to maintain an action for
damages. To maintain an action for damages, they would have needed to prove
"pecuniary losses." Acton, 386 S.W.2d at 364-65. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090
(1978) (prior to 1979 amendments). The text of section 537.090 is located at infra
note 44.
33. Acton, 386 S.W.2d at 369.
34. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (1978) (prior to 1979 amendment).
35. Acton, 386 S.W.2d at 369. Note also that the child in Acton was injured en
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the basis of the lack of demonstrable damages, Acton skirted the question that
would trouble later Missouri courts: whether a fetus was a person for the
purposes of the Missouri Wrongful Death Statute.3
The first time the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether a fetus never born alive was a "person" was in State e. rel Hardin
v. Sanders.37 Hardin denied a wrongful death cause of action for a viable
fetus that was injured en ventre sa mere and born dead.3 More significantly,
the Hardincourt also held that a fetus was not a "person" within the meaning
of wrongful death statute section 537.080. 39 Hardin based its decision on
four factors: (1) at common law an unborn fetus was not a person and if the
Missouri legislature wanted to define a fetus as a person they would have
done so explicitly; (2) that other words in the wrongful death statute like
"deceased" imply that the legislature intended to include only those persons
who had been born alive for wrongful death recovery; (3) that in other legal
contexts, perfection of a fetus's legal interests are contingent upon live
birth.40
In 1983, O'Grady v. Brown4' overruled Sanders. and held that a
wrongful death cause of action does exist for a viable fetus killed by a
tortfeasor and never born alive.42 O'Grady interpreted the 1979 amendments

ventre sa mere and never born alive. Id. at 364.
36. Recall that according to Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (1978) (prior to 1979
amendments) a party can maintain a wrongful death cause of action only for the death
of a person. For the relevant text of section 537.080, see supra note 32 and
accompanying text.
37. 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976).
38. Id. at 338-39.
39. Id. at 338.
40. Id. at 338-41. The court cited Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-62 (1973),
as an example that the "unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in
the whole sense." Hardin, 538 S.W.2d at 339. The court also noted that an unborn
child's interest in inheritance rights is generally contingent upon live birth. Hardin,
538 S.W.2d at 304-41.
41. 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983).
42. Id. at 910.
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to Missouri Wrongful Death Statute sections 537.0804" and 537.090."4
Amended section 537.090 states the following:
[p]arties [are] entitled thereto such damages as the trier of the facts may
deem fair and just for the death and loss thus occasioned, having regard to
the pecuniary losses suffered by reason of the death, funeral expenses, and
the reasonable value of the services, consortium, companionship, comfort,
instruction, guidance, counsel, training, and support of which those on
whose behalf suit may be brought have been deprived by reason of such
death ....
Amended section 537.090 significantly changed the nature of recoverable
damages allowed in wrongful death suits. Recall that in Acton and Hardinthe
pre-amendment section 537.090 was construed to allow recovery only for
pecuniary losses.4 s No recovery was permitted for loss of "companionship,
society, or comfort as a result of the death."46 Because amended section
537.090 allowed for the recovery of the loss of companionship, society, and
consortium, O'Grady held that parents of unborn children were among the
class of plaintiffs that the Missouri Wrongful death statute was designed to
protect.47

43. Id. at 907. As amended in 1979, Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (1986) states as
follows:
Whenever the death of a person results from any act, conduct, occurrence,
transaction, or circumstance which, if death had not ensued, would have
entitled such person to recover damages in respect thereof, the person or
party who or the corporation which, would have been liable if death had not
ensued shall be liable in an action for damages ....
Id.

For a complete discussion of the 1979 revisions to the Missouri Wrongful Death
statutes, see Michael J. Patton, Note, Missouri's New Wrongful Death Statute--Highlights of Some Significant Changes, 45 Mo. L. REV. 476 (1980).

44. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (1986) states in pertinent part:
In every action brought under section 537.080, the trier of the facts may
give to party or parties entitled thereto such damages as the trier of the facts
may deem fair and just for the death and loss thus occasioned, having
regard to the pecuniary losses suffered by reason of the death, funeral
expenses, and the reasonable value of the services, consortium, companionship, comfort, instruction, guidance, counsel ....
45. Acton v. Shields, 386 S.W.2d 363,367-69 (Mo. 1965); see also O'Grady 654
S.W.2d at 907. For the complete text of the pre-amended section 537.090, see supra
note 34 and accompanying text.
46. Acton, 386 S.W.2d at 366; see also O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 907.

47. O'Grady,654 S.W.2d at 907-10. The court discerned three objectives behind
the amended statute: "to provide compensation to bereaved plaintiffs for their loss, to

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/13

6

1992]

Kokal: Rambo I
WRONGFULKokal:
DEATH

O'Gradyalso determined that a fetus was a person for the purpose of the
Missouri Wrongful Death Statute section 537.080.48 The court noted that to
hold that a fetus was not a person would frustrate the legislative intent behind
the 1979 amendments. 49 Additionally, the court reiterated the analysis in
Steggal that the fetus itself has recognizable interests protected from injury at
birth.5 °
The O'Grady decision made two other significant changes in Missouri
wrongful death law. First, the court reversed a line of Missouri cases which
held that the wrongful death statute was in derogation of the common law and
should be strictly construed by the courts. 51 To be a derogation of common
law, the court held, there must be a "lessening, weakening, curtailment or
taking away of a power or authority."52 However, the wrongful death statute,
according to O'Grady, did not to take away a common law right. 53 Instead,
it "mend[ed] the fabric of the common law" providing additional statutory
remedies. 54 Further, the court held that "[r]emedial acts are not strictly
construed although they do change a rule of the common law."55 Thus, after
O'Grady, the wrongful death statute was not strictly construed; it was
interpreted "with a view to promoting the apparent objective of the legislative
'
enactment."56

ensure that tortfeasors pay for the consequences of their actions ... [and] to deter
harmful conduct." Id. at 909. The court noted that these policies support wrongful
death compensation for the parents without regard to whether the deceased child had
survived until birth. Id.
48. Id. at 910 (interpreting Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (1986)). For the complete
text of amended section 537.080, see supra text accompanying note 43.
49. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 910.
50. Id. at 909-11. The court found that in other situations, the infants' legal
interests were protected. For instance, an unborn child has property rights, id. at 909,
and a viable fetus is protected by the abortion statute. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973)).
51. Id. at 907-08. Although O'Grady did not acknowledge that it was implicitly
overruling Missouri precedent on this point, previous Missouri cases had held that the
wrongful death statute should be strictly construed. See Cummins v. Kansas City
Pub. Serv. Co., 66 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. 1933).
52. Id. (quoting 3 OxFoRD ENGLISH DIcrIONARY 232 (1933)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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III. RAMBO V. LAWSON: FACT SUMMARY AND HOLDING
Rambo involved the wrongful death of a non-viable fetus.57 Plaintiffs
Julius and Yulanda Rambo were riding in an automobile that collided with a

vehicle driven by defendant Lawson. 58 Yulanda was three months pregnant
at the time of the collision and suffered a miscarriage. 59 The Rambos sued
Lawson for negligence and sought damages for the wrongful death of their
unborn child.6 The case was dismissed by the trial court. 61 The Missouri
Western District Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal.6'
A. The Rambo Majority and Dissent Holding
Rambo decided two issues in Missouri wrongful death law: (1) whether
a fetus is a "person" per the Missouri wrongful death statute and;( (2) what
role viability should play in that determination.
The issue of whether a fetus is a "person" arises because Missouri law
only allows wrongful death recovery for the death of "persons":
Whenever the death of a person results from any act, conduct, occurrence,
transaction, or circumstance which, if death had not ensued, would have
entitled such person to recover damages in respect thereof, the person or
party who, or the corporation which, would have been liable if death had
not ensued shall be liable in an action for damages notwithstanding the
death of the person injured .. .
The majority and dissenting opinion in Rambo answered the question of
whether a fetus was a person by following the same conceptual framework as
O'Grady;66 they sought to determine the "legislative purpose" behind the
wrongful death statute. 67

57. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 62.
58. Id. at 62.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 62-63.
64. Id. at 62-64.
65. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (1986) (emphasis added).
66. See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the O'Grady
holding.
67. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 63.
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Judge Blackmar wrote the majority opinion in which Judges Higgins and
Billings joined.6 Judge Blackmar wrote that the legislative purpose behind
the wrongful death statute was not served by allowing recovery for a nonviable fetus. 69 70 His conclusion was based on four policy and statutory
considerations:
(1) there is always uncertainty and speculation about whether a pregnancy
will culminate in a live birth, and the uncertainty is greater during the early
part of the term; (2) the mother has won her action for negligently inflicted
injury, in which the circumstances of her pregnancy and miscarriage may
be brought out and considered as part of the intangible damages; (3) the
father has an action for loss of the mother's services, in which the jury may
consider such psychological problems as she may have sustained on account
of the accident; (4) fertile parents may conceive another child, and any
damage71to reproductive capacity may be compensated in the parents'
actions.

The majority also found that the Missouri anti-abortion statutes,
particularly section 1.205,' had no application in the wrongful death
context.73 Section 1.205 states the following:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, heath, and well
being;
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests in the
life, health, and well being of their unborn child.
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted and
construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of
development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other
74
persons, citizens, and residents of this state ....
The majority held that section 1.205 regulated only abortions. 75 The court
noted that section 188.01076 of the Missouri statutes made this intention
explicit when it stated: "It is the intention of the general assembly of the state

68. Id.

69. Id. at 63-64.
70. Id. at 63.
71. Id.
72. Mo. REv.

73.
74.
75.
76.

STAT. § 1.205 (1986).
Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 63.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205 (1986).
Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 64.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.010 (1986).
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of Missouri to grant the right to life to all humans, born and unborn, and to
regulate abortion .... ,"

The court assumed that if the legislature had

intended section 1.205 to modify wrongful death actions, the legislature would
have made this intention explicit. 78 As a result, "life does not begin at
conception" for the parents of a non-viable fetus, and the Rambos were denied
recovery.
Judge Holstein, author of the dissenting opinion, argued that viability
should play no role in determining whether a wrongful death cause of action
exists.79 The dissent rejected the viability standard on three grounds: (1)
because the common law recognized the fetus as a person;8" (2) medical
science recognized a non-viable fetus as a person;8' (3) medical science will
gradually expand the period by which fetuses are considered viable, thus the
viability distinction is unworkable and based on "shifting grounds."8 "
The dissent also criticized the majority's analysis of policy and legislative
intent. Judge Holstein noted that the four policy reasons cited by the majority
to deny wrongful death recovery for a non-viable fetus could also be made to
deny recovery for a viable fetus or even a newborn infant.83 Finally, the
dissent noted that, because a fetus who had been merely injured could recover
against the tortfeasor, it would be "economically preferable for a tortfeasor to
kill the fetus rather than merely injure the fetus." 84 Such a result, Judge
Holstein argued, contravenes the legislative purpose behind the wrongful death
statute.8

77. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 64 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.010 (1986)). See also
Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).

78. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 64. The court noted that in other areas of the original
anti-abortion bill package (S.C.H.B. 1596, L.1986 pp. 689-694 (1986)), the legislators
were aware of matters of civil liability. For instance, in Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 188.028.2(4) (1986), the legislators conferred immunity from suit by parent of a
minor on whom an abortion is performed by court authority. Similarly, Mo. REV.
STAT. § 188.120 (1986) created a cause of action for an employee who suffers
discrimination for refusing to perform an abortion. Because of this awareness of
matters of civil liability, the Rambo majority held that if the legislature had intended
to change another matter of civil liability (e.g. wrongful death) they would have done
so explicitly. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 64.
79. Id. at 66-70 (Holstein, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 67-69.
81. Id. at 68-69.
82. Id. at 69-70.
83. Id. at 70.
84. Id. at 71. This is because if the non-viable fetus is killed there could now be
no recovery for it under the Rambo majority holding. Id. at 64.
85. Id.
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B. The Rambo ConcurringOpinion
Unlike the Rambo majority and dissent, Judge Robertson's concurring
opinion refused to analyze the legislative intent behind the wrongful death
statute.8 The court was not free to interpret the legislative intent, according
to Judge Robertson, because of the legislative reenactment rule of statutory
construction.87 The legislative reenactment rule states that "[w]here the
Legislature, after a statute has received a settled judicial construction by a
court of last resort, re-enacts it or carries it over without change or reincorporates the exact language theretofore construed, it must be presumed that the
Legislature knew of and adopted such construction."8s
Judge Robertson argued that the legislative reenactment rule became
activated when the Missouri legislature reenacted the wrongful death statutes
in 1979.89 In other words, following the language of the legislative reenactment rule, the "settled judicial construction" of the wrongful death statute was
the decision of State e. rel Hardin v. Sanders.9° Hardin held that a fetus
was not a "person" for the purpose of the wrongful death statute until there
has been a live birth. 9' Because the legislature is presumed to be "aware of
the decisions of the courts when it chooses to use the words it uses," and the
legislature used the same word "person" when it reenacted the wrongful death
statute in 1979, Judge Robertson assumed that the legislature intended to
preclude fetuses from wrongful death recovery. 92
It then follows, according to Judge Robertson, that O'Grady and the
Rambo majority were incorrectly decided because they failed to take into
account that the legislature, by the legislative reenactment rule, had already
decided that a fetus was not a "person" under section 537.08093 of the
wrongful death statute. 94 Because Judge Robertson, however, would affirm

86. Id. at 65 (Robertson, J., concurring).
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting State ex rel Smith v. Atterbury, 270 S.W.2d 399, 403-04 (Mo.
1954)).
89. Id. at 65-66. For a discussion of the 1979 wrongful death reenactment, see
supra note 44 and accompanying text. Actually, as will be described in detail later,
the legislature did not re-enact the wrongful death statutes: it amended them. See
supra note 135-37 and accompanying text. This presents a problem for Judge
Robertson's opinion.
90. 538 S.W.2d 336 (1976).
91. Id. at 338.
92. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 65-66 (Robertson, J., concurring) (citing Citizens Elect.
Corp. v. Director of Dept. of Revenue, 766 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Mo. 1989)).
93. Mo. REv.STAT. § 537.080 (1986).
94. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 65-66 (Robertson, J., concurring).
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Hardin, which denied a cause of action for all fetuses never born alive, his
opinion concurs in the result reached by the majority. 95
IV. ANALYSIS: STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AS A BLUEPRINT FOR
MISSOURI TORT LAW?

A. Analysis of the Concurring Opinion
Judge Robertson's statutory construction argument is a novel and subtle
combination of three rules of statutory construction. The first rule ("Rule I")
triggers the application of statutory construction. It states that if a statute is
in derogation of common law, courts are "limited to the authority set out in
the statute" and the statute "[is] not subject to judicial expansion.'96 Judge
Robertson argued that the wrongful death statute was in derogation of
common lawY Because the wrongful death statute derogates common law,
Judge Robertson claimed that courts are constrained to the narrow intent of
the legislature when interpreting the wrongful death cause of action. 98 The
wrongful death statute should therefore be strictly construed. 99 In other
words, had the legislature intended to include fetuses as "persons" for
purposes of wrongful death, they would have done so explicitly. 1"
The other two rules invalidate the O'Grady decision by statutory
construction. The second rule ("Rule II") states that the legislature is "aware
[of] the decisions of the courts when it chooses the words it uses." 10 1 For
instance, in Citizens Electric Corp. v. Director of the Department of
Revenue,'1z the case Judge Robertson cited for support of his rule, 10 3 the
court was charged with interpreting the phrase "not organized for profit" for
purposes of section 147.010' °4 of the Missouri tax code. 10 5 The court held
that although the phrase "not organized for profit" had not been construed

95. Id. at 66.
96. Id. at 65.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. This is essentially the conclusion reached by the court in State ex rel.
Hardin v. Saunders, 538 S.W.2d 336, 338-39 (Mo. 1989).
101. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 65 (Robertson, J., concurring) (citing Citizens Elect.
Corp. v. Director of the Dept. of Revenue, 766 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Mo. 1989)).
102. 766 S.W. 2d 450 (Mo. 1989).
103. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 65 (Robertson, J.,
concurring).
104. Mo. REv.STAT. § 147.010 (1986).
105. Citizens Elect., 766 S.W.2d at 451.
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within the tax-law context, the legislature and courts 1 6 had expressly
defined the phrase within section 355107 of the Missouri Not for Profit
Corporation Statutes. 8 The Citizens Electric court thus assumed that the
legislature was aware of the decision of previous courts. When the legislature
used the phrase "not organized for profit," they meant the definition as found
in the Not for Profit Corporation Statutes."° Similarly, Judge Robertson
argued that when the legislature used the term "person" in section 537.080 of
the wrongful death statute, it is presumed that they did so with the knowledge
that "person" excluded fetuses per the Hardin decision.'
The third rule ("Rule III") Judge Robertson relied on is the usual
formulation of the "legislative reenactment rule." As mentioned above, this
rule states that when the legislature reenacts a statute without change which
has already been construed by the courts, it is presumed that the legislature
was aware of the court's interpretation and adopted it."' Using this rule,
Judge Robertson argued that when the legislature reenacted the wrongful death
statute in 1979, it was presumed to adopt the Hardin construction of the

statute."
The legislative reenactment rule, however, was not sufficient for Judge
Robertson's purpose because the reenactment of the wrongful death statute did
not "reincorporate the exact language theretofore construed."' 13 The language of the amended wrongful death statute was different from that of the
original statute. The most significant difference, as mentioned above,1 4 was

106. See State ex rel. Anderson v. Ozark Transmission Dist., 409 S.W.2d 71, 74
(Mo. 1966).
107. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 355.025 (1986).
108. Citizens ElecL, 766 S.W.2d at 451-52.
109. Id. at 452. Of course, the Citizens Electricsituation could be distinguished
from Rambo because in Citizens Electric there was a previous court decision and a
statute defining the phrase "not organized for profit." Id. In Rambo, there is only a
previous court decision. More importantly, the Citizens Electric decision was not
made in the context of a reenacted statute. This distinction is important because the
legislature had explicitly spoken to what "not organized for profit" entailed in Citizens
Electric. In Rambo, there is not explicit pronouncement by the legislature as to what
a "person" is. Rather, Judge Robertson infers by legislative silence that the legislature
meant that fetuses should not be considered persons. For a more detailed analysis of
this criticism of Judge Robertson's argument, see supra notes 121-60 and accompanying text.
110. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 65 (Robertson, J., concurring).
111. For a complete restatement of this rule, see supra text at note 88.
112. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 65-66 (Robertson, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 66. Reincorporating the exact language of the statute is a requirement
of the legislative re-enactment rule. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
114. For a complete description of the differences, see supra note 44-47 and
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the addition of language in section 537.090 that allowed compensation for loss
of comfort, companionship, and consortium."s The addition of this language, as noted above, 1 6 provided the impetus for the court in O'Grady to
V
overrule Hardini
The legislature, though, did reenact the same term "person. '' "s Thus,
by a combination of Rule II, which claims that the legislature is presumed to
be aware of court defined terms (in this case Hardin's definition that a fetus
is not a person) with Rule III, Judge Robertson presumed that the legislature
reenacted the Hardin definition of a "person" in the 1979 amendments to the
wrongful death statute." 9 Judge Robertson's opinion marks the first time
rule II and III have been combined by Missouri courts.12°
B. Criticism of the Concurring Opinion
This Note criticizes the statutory construction argument at three levels:
(1) by presenting evidence against the presumption; (2) by criticizing the
application of the presumption to the facts of this case; and (3) by criticizing
the presumption as normative Missouri law.
. 1. Evidence Against the Presumption
Unfortunately, there is no published legislative history in Missouri to
verify that the legislature was aware of the Hardin decision and intended to
preclude fetal wrongful death claims when it reenacted the wrongful death
statute.' There is, however, other evidence that the legislature was not
aware of the presumption. For instance, Senator Schneider, who co-sponsored
the wrongful death statute amendments, has indicated longtime support of

accompanying text.

115. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.090 (1986).
116. See supra notes 46 & 47 and accompanying text.
117. O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Mo. 1983).
118. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080-.090 (1986).

119. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 65 (Robertson, J.,
concurring).
120. Indeed, as mentioned above, it marks the first time that the legislative reenactment rule was used outside of the tax or corporate law context. See supra note
12 and accompanying text.
121. Indeed, the 1979 amendments to the wrongful death statutes were written by
Senators Dinger and Schneider. See S.368 4th Assembly 1st Sess. (1979). According
to the legislative research clerk in Jefferson City, all records pertaining to the
amendments were stored in Senator Dinger's office and were discarded with his
retirement from the legislature.
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granting all fetuses full legal and property rights of personhood."'

Thus,

it is unlikely that Senator Schneider would have proposed the 1979 wrongful
death amendments with the realization that their adoption would deny fetuses
this aspect of personhood.
Second, the wrongful death amendments passed without incident by an
overwhelming majority in both the Missouri House and Senate."12 Under

Judge Robertson's interpretation, the adoption of the amendments would have
been made with the legislators' explicit knowledge that they were specifically

denying the fetus the status of a statutory "person". Such an inference is
unlikely, given the legislators' mechanical approval24 of the amendments and

the legislature's later adoption of the abortion law.

2. Criticism as Applied to the Facts of Rambo
The three rules of statutory construction outlined above"'2 do not
readily fit the combined legal history of Rambo, O'Grady, and Hardin. First,
Rule I of Judge Robertson's statutory construction argument hinges on the

wrongful death statute being in derogation of the common law.1 26 O'Grady,
however, held that the wrongful death statute was a remedial act and not in

derogation of the common law. 27 Judge Robertson's opinion ignores this

aspect of the O'Grady decision. Moreover, if the wrongful death cause of

action is not in derogation of the common law, the statute need not be strictly
construed, which would allow the court to interpret the statutory language
"with a view to promoting the apparent objective of the legislative enact-

ment" -- precisely the approach taken by the Rambo majority.'

122. This information was obtained from a phone conversation with Senator
Schneider (R. 14th Dist.) who consented to the publication of his remarks in this Note.
123. The vote in the Senate for the adoption of the bill was 31-1. Mo. SEN. J.,
80th Assembly, p.1265 (1979). The vote in the House was 145-9. Mo. H. J., 80th
Assembly, pp. 1555-56 (1979).
124. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205 (1986), which granted fetuses protectable
interests in life, health, and well-being.
125. See supra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
126. "When the legislature creates a cause of action in derogation of the common
law, that cause of action is limited to the grant of authority set out in the statute."
Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 65 (Robertson, J., concurring). Thus, by negative implication,
the courts are not so constrained if the cause of action is not in derogation of the
common law. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text for an analysis of Judge
Robertson's application of Rule I.
127. See supra note 51-56 and accompanying text. See also Steggal v. Morris,
258 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1953).
128. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 908 (quoting United Airlines v. State Tax Comm'n
of Mo., 377 S.W.2d 444, 451 (Mo. 1964)).
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Judge Robertson's opinion also failed to discuss the O'Grady analysis of
the statutory construction argument. A statutory construction argument similar
to Judge Robertson's legislative reenactment argument confronted the
O'Grady court. 3 O'Grady dismissed the statutory construction argument
because the wrongful death statute is dependent on the common law right of
action for damages.13 ' Therefore, if courts expand the common law action
132
for damages, the scope of wrongful death recovery is also increased.
O'Grady further reasoned that the legislature's failure to close the link
between wrongful death and common law damages recovery "patently"
indicated that the legislature "did not intend to occupy this (wrongful death)
field of law entirely, leaving room for judicial development of wrongful death
remedies.', 133 The court noted that other jurisdictions similarly allowed
judicial expansion of the wrongful death remedy.3
Thus, under the
O'Gradyanalysis, the Rambo court should not be constrained to adhere to the
doctrine of strict statutory construction.
Rambo also fits very uneasily into Rule II and III. Missouri courts have
insisted that for the legislative reenactment rule to apply, the reenacted statute
must incorporate the exact language of the original statute for the presumption
to operate. 31 The 1979 amendments to the wrongful death statute, however,
did not incorporate the exact language of the original statute. 36 In fact, it
was this change in language that provided the impetus for the O'Grady court
137
to overrule Hardin.
Judge Robertson's concurring opinion skirts the "exact language"
requirement by combining Rule II with Rule 111.13' This combination has

129. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 63 (Robertson, J., concurring).
130. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 911.
131. Id. at 909. Wrongful death is dependent on the cause of action for damages
because Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (1986) allows recovery "[w]henever the death of
a person results... which, if death had not ensued, would have entitled such person
to recover damages. . . ." (emphasis added). Thus, wrongful death recovery is allowed
only if a cause of action for damages exists.
132. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 910-911.
133. Id. at 909.
134. Id. (citing Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977) (Tobriner, J.,
concurring); O'Neil v. Morse, 188 N.W.2d 785, 786 (Mich. 1971)).
135. See State ex rel. Smith v. Atterbury, 270 S.W.2d 399 (Mo. 1954); Roy F.
Stamm Elect. Co. v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 171 S.W.2d 580 (Mo. 1943); State
ex rel. Steed v. Nolte, 138 S.W.2d 1016 (Mo. 1940).
136. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
137. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 907-08.
138. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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never been attempted in Missouri law139-and for good reasons. To begin
with, the two rules of construction apply to completely different situations:
Rule III applies when the legislature reenacts the same statute,"4 while Rule
II applies when the words or phrases of a newly enacted statute already have
a settled meaning.14
Combining Rules H and III may also compromise legislative intent,
because Rule III applies to interpreting the statute as a whole, 14 not the
individual words of a statute. If the reenacted statute contains the same
language as the original, the legislative purpose behind the statute presumably
has not changed. On the other hand, if the reenacted statute contains
significantly different language than the enacted statute, then the intent behind
the statute has arguably changed. 43 Courts should be allowed to1 give effect
to this change in language by interpreting the statute differently. '"
Judge Robertson's statutory construction scheme, however, forecloses the
judiciary's ability to interpret the new language of the reenacted statute even
if the language of the statute has significantly changed. He accomplishes this
by applying Rule II, normally reserved to interpreting new statutes, to the
reenactment of an old statute.' 45 Using Rule II with a reenacted statute
compromises legislative intent with circular reasoning. For example, if the
word "liberal" was used in the context of a 19th Century social welfare statute,
the word might have been interpreted to mean a proponent of an egalitarian
government rather than a monarchy. If the same statute were later reenacted
with the same word "liberal" and other altered language, the word might be
intended to mean a proponent of the social welfare system. Nevertheless, by
Judge Robertson's construction argument, the word "liberal" must still mean
"a proponent of an egalitarian form of government," regardless of the intent
of the reenacting legislature. Using Rule II within the reenacted statute may
thus compromise legislative purpose because the definition of words in the

139. Only two Missouri cases have utilized Rule II: Citizens Elec. Corp. v.
Director of Dep't of Revenue, 766 S.W.2d 450 (Mo. 1989); Hudson v. School Dist.
of Kansas City, 578 S.W.2d 301, 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). Neither of these cases
mention the legislative re-enactment rule (Rule III).
140. See Synder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONsTRucrION § 49.09 (4th ed. 1984); 82 C.J.S. Statutes
§ 370 (1953).
141. United States v. Parker, 326 U.S. 803 (1945); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 370
(1953).
142. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
143. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 907.
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
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linguistic and historical context of the original statute may not be the
definition intended or implied within the new context of the reenacted statute.
O'Gradyand Rambo serve as other examples of how legislative purpose
may be compromised. For example, Hardin interpreted "person" within the
context of the original wrongful death statute to exclude fetuses.'46 The
wrongful death statute was reenacted in 1979 with a significant change in
language. 147 O'Grady determined that within this new context, the definition of the word "person" had changed as well: no longer would "person"
exclude fetuses per the Hardin decision, but "person" would include viable
fetuses as well.'4 Again, Judge Robertson's opinion would mandate the
Hardin definition of person even if the intent of the legislature had changed.
3. Normative Criticism
The legislative reenactment rule used by Judge Robertson has recently
received growing criticism from judicial and academic sources. 149 Most of
the criticism focuses on the legislative reenactment rule's ability to predict
legislative intent. 50 Indeed, one of the arguments often used to support the
rule is that the legislature is aware of all the judicial rulings concerning the
statute.'5' Thus, when the legislature reenacts the statute without change or
objection to the judicial rulings, the legislature intended to give effect to the
judicial interpretation. 5 2
Commentators have pointed out that although the legislative reenactment
rule may have had a valid application 100 years ago, with the explosive
growth of judicial decisions and administrative rulings, it is "absurd" to
suggest that the legislature takes notice of all judicial rulings.' s3 The
146. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
148. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 907-12.
149. See Filiberto Agusti, The Effect of Prior Judicial and Administrative
Constructions on Codification of Pre-Existing Federal Statutes: The Case of the
FederalSecurities Code, 15 HARv. J. LEG. 367, 385-87 (1978); Robert C. Brown,
Regulations,Re-enactment, and the Revenue Acts, 54 HARV. L. REV. 377,383 (1941);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., InterpretingLegislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67
(1988); John C. Grabow, CongressionalSilence and the Searchfor LegislativeIntent:
A Venture into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U. L. REV. 737 (1984).

150. Grabow, supra note 149, at 757-59.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Agusti, supra note 149, at 385-87 (stating that in 1907 there were 106

federal judges, not including the members of the Supreme Court. Today, there are 828
lower federal court judges); Brown, supra note 149, at 383; Grabow, supra note 149,
at 758.
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legislature lacks the ability to take notice of all judicial rulings. 5 4 Similarly, in Missouri, the proliferation of judicial decisions in the last century belies
the legislature's awareness of court decisions.'55
As a result, with the explosion of judicial rulings, the legislature's failure
to revise or repeal a provision that has received a judicial interpretation may
only indicate unawareness, rather than approval, on the part of the legislature. 156 Even commentators favorable to the legislative reenactment rule
have stated that the rule should not apply unless there is specific evidence that
the legislature was aware of the judicial decision.Y
Further, even with evidence that the legislature was aware of the judicial
decision, no conclusion should be drawn as to legislative intent. Commentators point out that inaction on the part of the legislature might just as well
indicate a "lack of interest," "preoccupation with more pressing matters," or
a belief that the matter is better "left to the courts" for resolution by judicial
interpretation."
Thus, in a situation like Rambo, the application of the legislative
reenactment rule of statutory construction is speculative at best. There is no
indication that the legislature was aware of the Hardin decision when it
Even if the legislature was
reenacted the wrongful death statute in 1979.'
aware of the decision, there is no indication that they intended to ratify Hardin
by reenacting the wrongful death statute. Indeed, as will be explained in the
next section, perhaps the legislature intended to modify Hardin by enacting
the anti-abortion statute. 16°

154. Grabow, supra note 149, at 758-59.
155. For example, a review of the Missouri reporter indicates that in 1911 there
were approximately 475 decisions made by the Missouri Supreme Court and the
Missouri Courts of Appeals. By contrast, in 1990, there were over 3500 decisions
made by the same courts (not including the multitude of decisions issued by
administrative agencies).
156. Grabow, supra note 149, at 757-59.
157. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 140, at 400.
158. See Grabow, supra note 149, at 759.
159. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 170 & 171 and accompanying text.
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE ANTI-ABORTION STATUTE
A. Analysis of the Rambo Decision
As mentioned above, Rambo denied applying section 1.205161 (the antiabortion law) to define fetal wrongful death rights.1 62 By its terms, the antiabortion law dramatically changes fetal rights under Missouri law. Section
1.205.1(3) of the abortion law, for instance, states that "[t]he natural parents
of unborn children have protectable interests in the life, health, and well-being
of their unborn child."''" Possibly more important to the wrongful death
arena, section 1.205.2 amends all Miss6uri laws to grant unborn children the
same legal rights as other citizens.' 64
Unfortunately, the Rambo court could not decide the applicability of
section 1.205(2) to the fetal wrongful death context because the statute was
not operative until after the Rambos' accident.6 There are indications in
Rambo dicta, however, that the court would not apply section 1.205(2) to the
wrongful death statute. The majority examined other provisions of the antiabortion bill'6 and concluded that "legislators were very aware of matters
of civil liability" and could have easily changed the wrongful death statute
itself. 67 The court concluded that there was "no indication in the text that
this bill [anti-abortion law] was designed to amend the wrongful death statute
which the legislature could easily have done had such been its intention."'"
B. Analysis of FutureProspects
The future effect of the anti-abortion statute on the wrongful death statute
remains uncertain. The Rambo majority refused to apply the anti-abortion law
to the wrongful death statute; however, the three judges in the majority will

161. Mo. REV.

STAT.

§ 1.205 (1986).

162. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
163. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(3) (1986).

164. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.2 (1986). See supra text accompanying note 74 for
the full text of this provision.
165. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 64.
166. The court examined Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 188.028.2(4), 188.120, 188.130
(1986). "Section 188.028.2(4) confers immunity from suit by parents of a minor on
whom an abortion is performed by court authority. Section 188.120 creates a cause
of action for an employee who suffers discrimination because of refusal to assist in an
abortion. Section 188.130 eliminates the so-called "wrongful life" actions." Rambo,
799 S.W.2d at 64. See also supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
167. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 64.
168. Id.
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soon retire from the court. 69 Surprisingly, none of the other judges directly
mention the abortion law in their decisions.
Future Missouri courts may address the issue of whether the anti-abortion
law regulates only abortion, or whether it can be applied to other areas of fetal
rights. By its terms, section 1.205.2 appears to change the "laws" of the state
(including the wrongful death statute), to grant fetuses full legal rights. This
section, when combined with section 1.205(3), which defines an "unborn
child" to include non-viable children, 70 forms a persuasive argument that
the legislature intended to include non-viable fetuses as "persons" within the
wrongful death statute. Judge Clark of the Court of Appeals for the Western
District of Missouri favored this interpretation.1 "
However, the anti-abortion law ostensibly only regulates abortions. The
title of the anti-abortion law reads: "An act to repeal sections... relating to
unborn children and abortions, and to enact in lieu thereof twenty new
Similarly, section 188.010
sections relating to the same subject.... ,,i72
states the general intent of the assembly in adopting the bill was to "grant the
right to life to all humans, born and unborn, and to regulate abortion... .,173
There is also no mention of an intent to change the wrongful death statute
within the text of the bill. 74
There are other indications, however, that the anti-abortion law is not so
limited. Missouri courts have applied the law in non-abortion contexts. For
instance, Judge Robertson's opinion in Cruzan v. Harmon 75 states that
provisions of the anti-abortion law 76 define an overall state policy of
"strongly favoring life."'7 Cruzan decided the rights of an incompetent
adult in a "persistent vegetative state,"178 not fetal abortion rights. Thus,
Cruzan could support the proposition of that the anti-abortion law should be

169. See supra notes 14 & 15 and accompanying text.
170. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205(3) (1986).
171. Rambo v. Lawson, No. WD 41747 (Mo. Ct. App. May 1, 1990).
172. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205 (1986) (preamble).
173. Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.101 (1986).
174. See supra notes 72 & 75 and accompanying text.
175. 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988).
176. Id. Judge Robertson examined three provisions of the anti-abortion law: (1)
Section 188.010, which states that the intention of the General Assembly is to grant
the "right to life of all humans, born and unborn ..... (2) Section 188.015(7), which
determines that a fetus is viable "when the life of the unborn child may be continued
indefinitely outside of the womb by natural or artificiallifesupportsystems" (emphasis
added); and (3) Section 188.130, which denies a cause of action for wrongful life and
birth. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 410.
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applied beyond the abortion context. Similarly, Judge Blackmar, dissenting
in Wilkins v. State,179 would extend section 188.02818' of the abortion law
to define a state policy against allowing a minor to plead guilty and request
the death penalty. Section 188.028 prohibits a minor from having an
abortion.18'
None of these examples, however, applies the anti-abortion law as
substantive law. Cruzan and Wilkins only cite the abortion law as an
indication of general legislative policy to favor life.182 Thus far, courts 1have
83
substantively applied the abortion law only within the abortion context.
If a Missouri court does apply section 1.205.2 to the wrongful death
context, they will have another obstacle to overcome: Article 3, Section 28
of the Missouri Constitution. Section 1.205.2, applied literally, would change
the definition of a "person" in every "law of Missouri" to include a fetus at
conception. But Section 28 precludes the legislature from making "blanket
amendments".'m That is, if the legislature intends to amend a statute, it
must amend the statute explicitly rather than leave the courts to guess as to
whether and in what respect an existing statute was amended.
The Missouri Supreme Court struck down similar blanket legislation in
State ex rel. McNary v. Stussie185 The statute in Stussie changed the age of
majority from 21 to 18 for purposes of Missouri law.'8 As with the anti-

179. 802 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1991) (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
180. Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.028 (1986).
181. Id.

182. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
183. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
184. See State ex rel. McNary v. Stussie, 518 S.W.2d 630, 634 (Mo. 1974).
The text of art. 3, section 28 of the Missouri Constitution reads as follows:
No act shall be revived or reenacted unless it shall be set forth at length as
if it were an original act. No act shall be amended by providing that words
be stricken out or inserted, but the words to be stricken out or the words to
be inserted, or the words to be -stricken out and those inserted in lieu
thereof, together with the act or section amended, shall be set forth in full
as amended.
Mo. CONST. ART. HI, § 28.
185. 518 S.W.2d 630 (1974).
186. Id. at 631. The proposed statute said, in part:
3. After the effective date of this act, a minor is a person who had not
attained the age of eighteen years and whenever the term 'twenty-one years
of age' is used as a limiting or qualifying factor it shall be deemed to mean
'eighteen years of age', and the revisor of statutes is hereby authorized to
make the appropriate changes in the Revised Statutes of Missouri as they
are revised, reenacted or reprinted.
Mo. S.B. 438, act 70, 77th Assembly, p. 190 (Vernon's 1974).
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abortion law, the statute in Stussie did not change the language contained in
individual Missouri statutes such as the voting age statute or the minimum age
for jurors statute.'" Rather, the statute intended to change all statutes:
"whenever the term 'twenty-one years of age' is included as a limiting or
qualifying factor [in Missouri law] it shall be deemed to mean 'eighteen years
of age'.... ,,,88
The Stussie court struck down the statute in accordance with
section 28 because it did not specifically amend other statutes."8 9 Thus,
because the abortion law would similarly change the wrongful death statute's
definition of a person indirectly, it would face serious constitutional challenges.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Rambo decision finally laid to rest the question of whether there is
a wrongful death cause of action for the death of a non-viable fetus. The door
remains open for the Rambo holding to be challenged by a future case.
Rambo expressly did not answer the question of whether the anti-abortion
statute (section 1.250) applied in the wrongful death context. New personnel
on the Missouri Supreme Court may again consider expanding the O'Grady
holding to cover non-viable fetuses.
The most troubling aspect of the Rambo decision, however, is the
statutory construction argument. Together with Citizens Electric,Rambo may
indicate a trend among the newer members of the Missouri Supreme Court
toward increased reliance on statutory construction arguments. As this Note
has pointed out, there are numerous theoretical and practical problems with
applying the legislative reenactment rule in a context like Rambo. 9" Future
Missouri courts should systematically deal with these conceptual difficulties
to avoid compromising legislative intent if they intend to apply statutory
construction arguments in a tort law context.
MICHAEL T. KOKAL

187. Id.

188. Mo. S.B. 438, Act 70, 77th Assembly, p. 190 (Vemon's 1974).
189. Id. at 636.
190. See supra notes 121-60 and accompanying text.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

23

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 13

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/13

24

